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LaborAtlas
Beta

First-pass policy explorer. Figures are pinned to the projection cube at a fixed scenario; switch axes on the Atlas to test alternatives.

Policy · Beta

Policy happens somewhere. Pick the place.

The national gap is real, but no one governs the nation's labor market in the abstract. Choose a scale — the country or a state — and the map and the read-out below shift to that place: where its shortage sits, where AI displacement lands, and what migration and reskilling actually buy there.

Shaded by projected 2034 shortage · click a state to focus it

The United States

Worker shortage · 2034

transformative AI · 10% wage cap

AI-displaced · 2034

transformative AI · AI-attributable · rigid floor

Where the shortage is

    Where the displacement is

      That's where the gap sits. What policy can do about it — reskill, relocate, or import labor — is the toolkit below, for this same place.

      The toolkit · interactive · United States

      What policy can do here.

      Three frictions sit between the displaced and the shortage — occupation, geography, and sheer numbers. Move the levers; the bar re-flows. Potential capacity, not a forecast — change the place with the selector up top.

      The gap, closing

      — displaced

      Relocate — Reskill — Stranded —

      …and the shortage it fills

      — shortage

      Move the levers below to see how far each one closes the gap.

      01 · Reskilling

      each package pairs reach with success — success falls with skill distance; 100% is not on the dial. Sectoral RCTs +14–40%; broad WIA ≈ null.

      02 · Relocation

      in-state matches (many need no move at all) and cross-state moves carry separate take-up. US mobility halved since the 1980s; displaced move least.

      03 · Migration

      two-sided: migrants add labor supply and consumer demand (Hong–McLaren), so both readouts move — and the model can't net a surplus in one occupation against a shortage in another.

      Evidence & caveats

      Reskilling. Sector-focused RCTs lift earnings 14–40% and persist (Year Up; Project QUEST @14y; Per Scholas @7y) — but on selected participants, at limited scale; broad WIA/WIOA programs show ~null average effects. Each slider detent is a named package pairing reach with success: today’s programs ≈ 40/15/5% success on near/moderate/broad skill jumps; sectoral-at-scale ≈ 60/35/15%; a GI-Bill-scale effort (the only precedent at the required magnitude: ~7.8M trained over 12 years) caps the dial at 75/55/35%. Success falls with skill distance in every package — 100% is not on the dial. Katz et al. 2022.

      Relocation. US geographic mobility has fallen 40+ years; interstate moves ~halved since the 1980s, and displaced / less-educated workers move least; TAA relocation allowances historically moved workers in the low thousands per year. The slider scales take-up per ring — in-state matches (which include staying put in your own labor market) vs cross-state moves: today’s programs ≈ 40/4%; subsidies + licensure portability ≈ 55/12%; historic (WWII-scale) mobilization caps the dial at 70/25%. Molloy–Smith–Wozniak.

      What the caps mean. The dials stop at evidence, not at logic: at zero friction the matching engine could place ~all feasible matches (the possibility frontier shown under the bar) and nearly clear the shortage on paper — a statement about skill distance, not an achievable program. Track shading: solid = observed programs; tinted = evidence-backed ambition; hatched = historical precedent only. Package rates are drafted calibrations pending final review.

      Migration. Two-sided by construction: migrants add labor supply (which fills shortage jobs) and consumer demand (which creates them — the local-demand channel of Hong & McLaren 2015; NAS 2017). The net effect fills part of the gap — not a free lunch, and it attenuates toward neutral under the most extreme AI scenario, where displacement has already loosened the markets migrants would fill.

      All figures are 2034 comparative-static potential, not forecasts. Everything on this page — the tiles above and the levers here — reads the same certified state-level cube (metro + non-metro, full US coverage): shortage at transformative AI × 10% wage cap, displaced = AI-attributable (net of the no-AI corner). Relocation & reskilling are matching overlays; migration volume is a structural GE re-solve; the bar fills domestic reabsorption first, migration on the remainder. Occupation granularity: 22 SOC major groups at state resolution — coarse cells overstate matchability (credential gates inside a group are invisible), which is part of why the take-up dials cap where they do. Migration tick marks (≈’20 trough, ≈’23–24 surge) are qualitative: the model baseline is a gross inflow, historical comparisons are net.

      Projections: Bahar & Wright (2026), BW-LaborShortages Composite Spatial Equilibrium. Immigration ladder and AI-displacement come straight from the model cube (baseline / −50% / no-new immigration). Evidence on lever magnitudes: National Academies of Sciences (2017), The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration; Hong & McLaren (2015), NBER w21123 (immigrants’ local-demand channel); BLS & MPI (2024) on foreign-born occupation shares; Katz, Roth, Hendra & Schaberg (2022), NBER w28248 (sectoral-training RCTs); Roder & Elliott / Economic Mobility Corp. (Project QUEST); Fortson et al. (2017), DOL WIA Gold-Standard evaluation (null generic training); Escobari, Seyal & Daboin Contreras (2021), Moving Up, Brookings (skill-cluster mobility). Reskilling-absorbability split is national (transformative-AI scenario); per-place reskilling routes are a planned refinement.